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NOTES
CORPORATIONS: PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
The creation of a separate legal entity by the act of incorporation'
has its origin in the need for a method of controlled investment which
does not saddle the investor with the individual risks and liabilities
inherent in partnerships. 2 When used for this purpose the corporation is a very beneficial tool in the business world. Occasionally,
however, it has become necessary for the courts to disregard the
fiction of a separate entity and treat the corporation as the alter ego
of the stockholders, thereby imposing on them the liabilities they
have attempted to escape. Inasmuch as Professor Wormser has ably
treated this so-called doctrine of piercing the corporate veil as applied generally throughout the United States, 3 this note will be limited to the application of the theory in Florida.
The Supreme Court of Florida first recognized this theory in 1911:4
"The rule or fiction of law that a corporation is a separate
entity .. .does not always obtain in a court of equity where
to do so would result in enabling the shareholders of a private
corporation who substantially own and control a corporation and
its officers who are those identical shareholders to perpetrate
frauds on those who deal with them."
Had the Florida Court subsequently restricted the piercing of the
veil to cases reasonably within the scope of this statement, the confusion presently existing in the field might have been obviated.
'E.g., McCarroll v. Ozarks Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 201 Ark. 329, 146 S.W.2d
693 (1941); H. A. S. Loan Service, Inc. v. McColgan, 21 Cal.2d 518, 133 P.2d

391 (1943); Dregne v. Five Cent Cab Co., 381 Ill. 594, 46 N.E.2d 386 (1943);
Home Motors v. Latimer, 148 S.W.2d 1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
2

The statutes governing incorporation in most states provide that the corpora-

tion is a separate entity as to liability of stockholders, e.g.,

A.A. CODE tit.

10, §28

(1940); FLA. STAT. §611.06 (1949); ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 32, §157.23 (SmithHurd Supp. 1950); Mo. REv. STAT. §4997.24 (Supp. 1945); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18,
§127 (1937).
3

WoRmsER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION

(1929).
South Florida Citrus, Land Co. v. Waldin, 61 Fla. 766, 772, 55 So. 862,

PROBLEMS
4

864 (1911).

[352]

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol4/iss3/3

2

Gimbel: Corporations: Piercing the Corporate Veil

NOTES
Most of the Florida eases in this field involve (1) misuse of incorporation in order to defraud creditors and others dealing with the
corporation, or (2) misuse of incorporation in order to circumvent
regulatory statutes, or (3) deliberate misuse or careless use of incorporati6n, with resultant difficulties in the disposition of the cor-

porate assets upon the death of the controlling stockholder.
DEFRAuDInG CnEurros AND OTms

The reasoning in Biscayne Realty & Ins. Co. v. Ostend Realty Co.has often been cited, 6 yet the application of this case as authority
for piercing the corporate veil should be limited by the fact that
there was but one stockholder with any control, and by the further
fact that the corporation had in actuality become dormant prior to
the transaction involved. The opinion lays down the principle that
when a controlling stockholder enters into a transaction for his own
private benefit and in attaining this benefit uses the corporate fiction to misledd creditors, the fiction should be disregarded and the
stockholder held personally liable.7
The Supreme Court in setting aside the corporate entity in Third
Avenue Co. v. Keely8 cited the Biscayne case as not effectively distinguishable. Actually the two cases are quite different. In the
Third Avenue case a group of individuals owned several corporations,
all of which were very active when the transactions took place. Furthermore, one of the corporations was insolvent and subject to an
action under statutory law for preferring creditors. 9 Because of
this second factor Justice Davis concurred in the judgment of personal liability to the corporation, but he wrote a separate opinion
wherein he tried to check wholesale extension of the doctrine of
"piercing the veil," stating: 10
5109 Fla. 1, 148 So. 560 (1933).
6See, e.g., Riley v. Fatt, 47 So.2d 769. (Fla. 1950); Riesen v. Maryland Casualty Co., 153 Fla. 205, 14 So.2d 197 (1943); Miakka Estates, Inc. v. B. L. E.
Realty Corp., 132 Fla. 307, 181 So. 423 (1938); Mayer v. Eastwood-Smith &
Co., 122 Fla. 34, 164 So. 684 (1935); Saffold Bros. Produce Co. v. Winn &
Lovett Gro. Co., 111 Fla. 60, 149 So. 1 (1933).
7
Cf. In re First Nat. Bank, 23 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. M]I.1938).
8111 Fla. 46, 149 So. 30 (1933).
9
FLA. STAT. §612.45 (1949).
1OThird Avenue Co. v. Keely, 111 Fla. 46, 53, 149 So. 30, 33 (1933). This
distinction is fundamental to the application of the doctrine discussed in this note.
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"I cannot agree to the theory that a corporate entity can be entirely disregarded solely because it is owned by a few persons
who use its corporate character .. .to avoid personal liability.
The test is whether the transaction was personal or corporate;
not whether a transaction ...was so made to avoid its being
a personal transaction. Avoidance of personal liability is to be
distinguished from evasion of such liability."
The Court enlarged somewhat the scope of application of the
doctrine, without doing violence to the doctrine itself, by piercing
the corporate veil when the sole stockholder of two corporations used
them together to perpetrate a fraud on a customer of one of them."
Bellaire Securities Corp. v. Brown 2 is probably the most important Florida decision in the field, even though its facts did not persuade the Court to disregard the corporate entity. The opinion ap13
provingly quoted Professor Wormser as follows:
" .. .ifthe corporation has been validly organized in its inception, the use of the corporation to prevent the incurring of
personal obligations in the future is entirely proper and legitimate. . . . When the conception of corporate entity is employed to defraud creditors, to evade an existing obligation, to
circumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate monopoly, or to
protect knavery or crime, the courts will draw aside the web
of entity, .. . and will do justice between real persons.'"
Although the Court has generally adhered to the above rule, it
has in some instances tended to go further. Just prior to the Bellaire
case the doors were opened wide by a statement that in equity the
entity theory is merely a formula for working out the rights of the
real parties in interest. 14 If that statement be taken literally, then
there can be no reliance on the limited liability that is supposedly
If a person uses foresight and incorporates to prevent incurring future personal
liability, he avoids it legitimately; but if be has already incurred a personal
liability and uses incorporation to circumvent it, he is practicing evasion.
1"Fickling Properties v. Smith, 123 Fla. 556, 167 So. 42 (1936); cf. Finley
v. Union Joint Stock Land Bank, 281 Mich. 214, 274 N.W. 768 (1937).
12124 Fla. 47, 168 So. 625 (1936).
13Id. at 68, 168 So. at 633.
14 See Hirsch v. Lincoln Securities Co., 118 Fla. 164, 171, 160 So. 12, 14

(1935).
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the primary advantage of incorporation. Even after the Bellaire case
we find this loose statement:1 5
'M Court has repeatedly held that it will not hesitate to
'pierce the veil of the corporate fiction' when it is shown that the
corporation was organized... to avoid personal liability ......
Whether the Court actually meant exactly what it said is doubtful
in this instance, however; it found no intent to organize for the
purpose of avoiding personal liability, and accordingly refused to
disregard the fiction. It may reasonably be concluded that the
Court was referring to the evasion of existing personal liabilities'6
rather than the avoidance of possible future liabilities; this latter is,
17
after all, the primary purpose of incorporation.
The veil was pierced when a stockholder conveyed land to his
corporation in order to prevent an option to repurchase, held by his
personal grantor, from being adjudged a mortgage rather than an
absolute deed under Florida law.' 8 Although the doctrine did not
originally purport to be the remedy for this type of maneuver, the
decision could hevertheless be sustained on grounds of justice were
it not for the fact that the option agreement had expired three years
prior to the conveyance.
Two additional cases in this category extend the doctrine well
beyond its reasonable bounds. In the first situation the veil was
pierced because the stockholders had organized a corporation to
hold title to stock in a North Carolina bank, their purpose being to
avoid the statutory liabilities attaching to such stock ownership if
the bank became insolvent 9 Justice Davis' dissenting opinion clear15See Yates v. St. Johns Beach Developfihent Co., 129 Fla. 411, 415, 176 So.
422, 423 (1937). Contra: Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E.2d 259
(1937); Buckner v. Dillard, 184 Okla. 586, 89 P.2d 326 (1939); National Hotel
Co. v. Motley, 123 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
' 6 The matter of pre-existing liabilities was discussed in a dictum in Bellaire

Securities Corp. v. Brown, 124 Fla. 47, 68, 168 So. 625, 633 (1936).
17See the dissent of Davis, J., in Harris-Inv. Co. v. Hood, 123 Fla. 598, 616,
167 So. 25, 32 (1936); cf. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 833
(1925); Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 10 N.E.2d 259 (1937); Buckner v.
Dillard, 184 Okla. 586, 89 P.2d 326 (1939); National Hotel Co. v. Motley, 123
S.W.2d 461 (Ter. Civ. App. 1988).
18Markell v. Hilpert, 140 Fla. 842, 192 So. 392 (1939).
19
Harris Inv. Co. v. Hood, 123 Fla. 598, 167 So. 25 (1936).
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ly points out the major error in most of the questionable decisions
disregarding the corporate entity, namely, failure to employ the
proper remedy; the situation can usually be dealt with adequately on
some other theory. 20 The second case held Southeastern Greyhound
Lines liable for the negligence of an insolvent bus company even
though Southeastern owned less than a controlling interest in the
smaller company.2 ' This decision marks perhaps the furthest extension of the doctrine in Florida.
CIRCUMVENTING BEGULATORY STATUTES

The few Florida cases in this category, all recent, seem to be
within the proper limits. The proposition that the corporate entity
cannot be used to evade the law has been advanced as the broad
basis for these decisions. 22 This statement was qualified in a later
case, however, by the implication that an intent to evade the law
must exist when the corporation is organized if the veil is to be
pierced.

23

The converse situation appears in FloridaIndustrial Commission v.
Schwob Co.,24 in which the Court refused to pierce the veil upon
request of the incorporator. To do so would have resulted in the
evasion of tax payments required by law; and the Court quite properly reasoned that an incorporator cannot accept the benefits of incorporation and yet cause the veil to be pierced whenever the corporate device becomes disadvantageous.
DisPosrroN AT DEATH OF

CONTROLLING

STOCKHOLDm

The Florida Court has twice been asked to pierce the corporate
veil upon the death of the controlling stockholder, the contention
201d. at 616, 167 So. at 32.
21
Barnes v. Liebig, 146 Fla. 219, 1 So.2d 247 (1941).

But see Southeastern

Greyhound Lines v. Harden, 281 Ky. 345, 348, 186 S.W.2d 42, 44 (1940).
22
State Board of Funeral Directors & Embalmers v. Cooksey, 155 Fla. 761,
21 So.2d 542 (1945) (evasion of restraining order rather than a statute); cf. Alabama Power Co. v. MeNinch, 94 F.2d 601 (App. D.C. 1937); H. A. S. Loan
Service v. MeColgan, 21 Cal.2d 518, 133 P.2d 391 (1943); Nettles v. Sottile,
184 S.C. 1, 191 S.E. 796 (1937).
23
State ex rel. Continental Distilling Sales Co. v. Vocelle, 158 Fla. 100, 27
So.2d 728 (1946).
24153 Fla. 356, 14 So.2d 666 (1943).
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being that, at the death of a person who has had for all practical
purposes entire control of a corporation, its assets and liabilities
should be included in his personal estate. In one of these instances
the testator intended that the corporation be regarded as a separate
entity; it. was a going concern and, although solely owned by him,
was at all times treated as entirely apart from his personal interests.25
In the other instance the testators intent was apparently the opposite, inasmuch as the corporation was organized long before his
death and was treated by him as a mere convenience. 26 In neither
instance, however, was the veil-pierced. In the latter case the Court
wisely rejected the argument that the intent of the testator is controlling, and refused to disregard the corporate entity in the absence
of any showing of fraud in either its organization or its use.
MiSCELANous CASEs

Several Florida cases in this field do not fit readily into the foregoing categories, and yet they are of sufficient import to warrant
discussion. In a partition suit the Court disregarded the entity and
allowed a sale of the corporate property in order to distribute the
proceeds among the stockholders.27 The force of this decision as
stare decisis is tempered, however, by the fact that the stockholders
were all members of one family and had recently inherited equal
shares of the stock from their mother. Again, when a personal reprepresentative formed a corporation to carry on the testator's business the Court refused to pierce the veil in the absence of any showing of fraud or ulterior motive.28 And in Ulrich v. Reineking,29 in
which the majority of the Court affirmed without opinion, dissenting
Justices Chapman and Buford argued that the corporate entity should
be pierced because the stockholder and the corporation had joined in
a conspiracy to defraud Mr. and Mrs. Ulrich of their land.3 0
25

Compare Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936), with Scoville v. Vail Inv. Co., 55 Ariz. 486, 103 P.2d 662 (1940) (corporation organized

solely for convenience in passing decedents property at death, yet treated as a
separate entity).
26
Patchen v. Robertson, 146 Fla. 138, 200 So. 400 (1941).
27Wofford v. Wofford, 129 Fla. 445, 176 So. 499 (1937).
28Fowler v. Hartridge, 156 Fla. 585, 24 So.2d 306 (1945); Conant v. Blount,
141 Fla. 27, 192 So. 481 (1939).
29144 FLa. 284, 198 So. 74 (1940).
Sld. at 292, 198 So. at 77.
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In contrast to the meticulous preservation of the entity in the Ulrich
case, the Court chose to disregard it when an architect who had incorporated sued personally on a purported mechanic's lien based
on work done by the corporation. 3' Upon finding that the architect
was known to all to be the real party in interest, the Court brushed
aside the defense that a corporation cannot obtain a mechanic's lien.
The Florida Court has recently indicated that it has the power, in
a supplementary proceeding in aid of execution, to pierce the veil in
order to allow a creditor of a corporation to collect from its controll32
ing stockholder.
LAw oR EQurrY

Although most of the cases involving disregard of the corporate
entity are in equity, a suit to pierce the veil does not of itself confer
equitable jurisdiction; the cases are usually based on some recog33
nized ground of equity jurisdiction such as specific performance,
foreclosure, 34 or partition.3 5 The Court has as a rule refused to
disregard the entity in an action at law and has insisted that the bona
fides of a corporation must be determined in equity.3 6 The picture
remains confused, however, because in at least one action at law
37
the entity was disregarded.
CoNcLusIoN

Although the doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity was
designed originally for a few selected situations involving primarily the
defrauding of creditors, it has developed in Florida into a catch-all
31

Robert L. Weed, Architect, Inc. v. Homing, 159 Fla. 847, 33 So.2d 648

(1947).
32

Riley v. Fatt, 47 So.2d 769 (1950).
UIrich v. Reineking, 144 Fla. 284, 198 So. 74 (1940); Fickling Properties
v. Smith, 123 Fla. 556, 167 So. 42 (1936).
34
Miakka Estates, Inc. v. B. L. E. Realty Corp., 132 Fla. 807, 181 So. 423
(1938).
35
Wofford v. Wofford, 129 Fla. 445, 176 So. 499 (1937).
33

36

Huttig v. Huffman, 151 Fla. 166, 9 So.2d 506 (1942).

37

Barnes v. Liebig, 146 Fla. 219,. 1 So.2d 247 (1941), hardly distinguishable
on this procedural point on the mere basis that the veil was pierced in order
to reach the parent corporation rather than the individual stockholder; see Riley
v. Fatt, 47 So.2d 769, 772 (1950).
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remedy. This undue extension is unfortunate. There are practical
ways and means of determining the credit risk in dealing with a
particular corporation; and, since the limited liability of corporate
stockholders is common knowledge in the business world, the creditor knows beforehand the limitations he accepts when he chooses
to do business with a corporation.
Mere performance of an illegal act by a corporation through its
directors is not in itself any justification for completely disregarding
the separate entity and charging the stockholders with personal liability. Furthermore, this theory of piercing the veil should not be
used if there is another adequate remedy. The entity should not be
brushed aside without a showing of intent by the stockholders to
employ the corporate device to defraud, to evade a statute, to achieve
a monopoly, or to escape liability for crime. The true test, it is
submitted, is not the mere acquisition of personal insulation and
other normal advantages through the use of incorporation, but
rather the formation of a corporation, or the utilization of an existing one, in order to evade personal liabilities or personal restrictions
already in existence. If confined to this rule, the theory can be a
useful one. On the other hand, its continued extension can eventually cause the destruction of the highly useful corporate device as
we know it today.
ALLAN
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